the weight of evidence points to its implication in a few human deaths already -and the possibility of thousands in the future.8 This possibility, combined with the horrific nature of the disease and speculation on the extent of dissemination outside Britain, has ensured that BSE has acquired a global rather than merely a British or even European status. Mad Cow Disease has led herdsmen near Samarkand to express sympathy with British tourists over their likely fate; New Zealand butchers display notices emphasizing the disease-free status of their supplies. Modern communication has meant that the economic losses to cattle producers spread faster and more widely than the disease itself.9
The obscurity which attends the origins and early dissemination of plagues is inevitably a contributing factor to their ultimate status. It helped ensure that the Black Death was but the first (if also the worst) of a series of periodic outbreaks which afflicted Western Europe until the late seventeenth century and menaced it for another 200 years. The drama of the initial impact of rinderpest in Britain in 1865 was due as much to its novelty as to the high level of deaths it caused. Despite the fact that the disease was endemic in Europe, the general British ignorance about it ensured its rapid early spread.'? The history of both Aids" and BSE provides abundant testimony that the advance of science has not ended the mystery and uncertainty which attend the advent of new diseases. In the case of BSE, the first official diagnosis of a cow with spongiform encephalopathy came in 1986, while there was later confirmation of the same symptoms on a Kent farm a year earlier. However, livestock producers thought that these were neither the first nor the only cases, a view since confirmed. As John Wilesmith points out, the early cases diagnosed were too spread-out to have originated from a single source. BSE was widely disseminated by 1986 and, given a normal incubation period of between four and five years, its origins lie early in the 1980s if not before.12 8 John Collinge et al., 'Molecular Analysis of Prion Strain Variation and the Aetiology of "New Variant" CJD', Nature, 383 (1996), 685-90, for the close correspondence between BSE and the new encephalopathy in humans. David C.G. Skegg, 'Epidemic or false alarm', Nature, 385 (1997), 200, for an estimate (admittedly on a small information base) of between 100 and 80,000 deaths over the course of a BSE 'epidemic'. 9 The Economist, 26 October 1996, 18 January 1997; pers. comm. and see, for example, Australian, 18 January 1997, for the harm to cattle interests in BSE-free regions. However, dramatic falls in meat consumption in Japan and Germany may be as much a result of outbreaks of food poisoning due to E coli bacteria. See the Guardian Weekly, 4 August 1996 and Private Eye, 9 August 1996 for the deaths of seven children among thousands affected in each case. Also Private Eye, 11 January 1997 for the British E coli outbreak, the deathrate from which is greater than that from the new CJD variant in humans. 
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Fisher. The Mystery of Mad Cow Disease transmission, this is now conceded as a possibility (if at low levels). As for horizontal transmission, the SVS argues that this would be inconsistent with the high number of isolated cases of BSE, but other European countries act on the assumption that it can happen.19
An even greater puzzle is the limited incidence of BSE outside Britain. Apart from Switzerland, there have been very few cases reported in European countries, even those which imported large quantities of contaminated MBMs and live cattle from Britain in the 1980s when, as is now realized, BSE incidence was at its peak.20 These imports have been a growing source of strain between Britain and its European Union partners (especially when the French discovered that they had been supplied MBMs banned in Britain21), but the real concern has centred on the export of British beef (among other cattle produce), reflecting concern over the possible transmission to humans. In this respect, increases in knowledge have played a seemingly perverse role. Not much was known about spongiform encephalopathies (SEs) before the onset of BSE. Much more is known now, but this has accentuated rather than assuaged the uncertainties which promote fear and tension.
Encephalopathies are a very special type of disease. They present scientists with fascinating puzzles, many of which show no immediate sign of being unravelled. The causative agent, for example, is unknown. By 1993, it had come to be generally accepted that protein particles, containing no DNA or RNA, 'that have some of the characteristics of a slow virus', were intimately involved in such diseases. These are now referred to as prions, but whether they are cause or effect is still uncertain -the latest research findings suggest the latter. Stanley Prusiner's work may have been a major scientific breakthrough but, even given later research on how prions become malignant,22 this has no immediate relevance to the control of BSE or other SEs.
Observation and experiment have mainly served to demonstrate the variability of the transmissibility of SEs within and between different species. Beyond the 20 strains of scrapie, there are at least three affecting humans. 
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Only BSE has appeared in British cattle, although American veterinarians have speculated on the incidence of a mild form of SE in their stock. The vertical (maternal) and lateral transmissibility of some strains of scrapie is known, while about 15 per cent of cases in humans 'are thought to result from inherited mutations in the gene implicated in Creutzfeldt Jakob disease' (CJD). It was already known before BSE appeared that some SEs, including scrapie (but with no known case of transmission to humans), could cross the species barrier.23 Enhancing knowledge on this score provided a rich research agenda but no common pattern has emerged.
As for transmission to humans, attempts of some ingenuity have been made to circumvent the unacceptability of direct experimentation. Ominously, intracerebral injection of BSE into macaques produced brain lesions similar to those in the human victims of a variant of CJD. John Collinge began his experiments on mice with introduced human genetic material in 1995 and, early in 1996, these had still not succumbed to BSE.24 However, any possible heartening effect on public opinion was swamped by the dramatic announcements of the most significant addition to knowledge on transmissibility since the first official diagnosis of BSE itself.
In 
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in Private Eye thought that 'MAFF mandarins seem more concerned to protect animals than people.'32 The pursuit took on a new stridency after the March panic. Two British historians found the origins of MAFF behaviour in its history: it had always 'minimised the human health risk (of livestock disease) for fear of panic about one of the farming industry's most important products'. Scares like BSE 'will continue until the administrative ethos of the Ministry of Agriculture, which frankly seems to have changed very little over the last 100 years, can be fundamentally readjusted to be more responsive to consumer needs'.33
If the specious nature of public statements was their only fault, then such accusations might not need to be taken too seriously. Governments and their agencies have an evident and natural interest in minimizing public alarm in conditions of uncertainty, but this does not necessarily correspond to deliberate misinformation. As noted earlier, the initial investigations into BSE were highly successful, regulations were progressively strengthened as more became known about the disease and MAFF's principal control measure worked. Unfortunately, however, MAFF's record on containing the possible spread of the disease to humans, what really mattered as far as national and international opinion was concerned, was grossly deficient.
In 1993, in the course of a periodic bout of concern over BSE, an editorial in Nature accepted that 'the raw materials of cattle feed are now tightly controlled, while there are rigorous inspections of meat sent for sale'.34 It was wrong. MAFF failed to gain or enforce compliance with its regulations in virtually every area of concern. With compensation payments often inadequate, notification of BSE has been haphazard and the export certification system (given a substantial price premium for cattle exports) has been rife with evasion.35 The situation in feedmills and abattoirs, on the basis of evidence from MAFF itself, was even worse. An audit in 1994 could not account for half of the specified bovine offal ( Even when compliance is high, regulation requires effective monitoring. When compliance is poor, policing is difficult and puts pressure on limited public resources. In 1865, the early regulations against rinderpest were flouted with impunity. Even when stockowners had become convinced of the necessity of stamping out rinderpest, compliance remained far from perfect, ensuring that the epizootic was not eradicated until 1867. In fact, throughout its history, a major problem for the SVS -the descendant of the Veterinary Department hastily established in 1865 -has been finding the resources necessary to ensure effective compliance.38 During the BSE saga, this problem has been exacerbated by growing fiscal stringency in the public sector (a trend reinforced by ideologies reminiscent of the laissez-faire dominant at the time of the cattle plague), and the need to respond to heightened concerns over food safety generally. The inception of a new centralized Meat Hygiene Service (MHS) in 1995 was a response to such concerns but, in the short run at least, the change was counter-productive. A year after its birth, an MHS operations director conceded that, given the attendant structural problems, the proper monitoring of meatworks remained virtually impossible.39
Human frailty has thus been only too evident in the BSE saga. As knowledge of regulatory inadequacies has grown, it has reinforced scepticism and suspicion of government and government agencies to the point where they have come to be considered the cause of the problem rather than merely an exacerbating factor. Nevertheless, and despite their demonstrated inadequacies, it remains the case that BSE was prevalent before any regulations could realistically have been put in place. While some containment policies could have been mounted earlier and more effectively, this was hardly warranted by the existing state of knowledge and would have been at the expense of other programmes -at a time when resources were inadequate to meet the continued spread of sheep scab and various crises over salmonella.40 Even then, subsequent policy defects were of relatively marginal importance in the light of the quantities of potentially contaminated cattle produce which would have entered human food supplies before 1988. The extent to which this point has been overshadowed by the continuing diatribes against government and government agencies points to a further theme which has accentuated the status of BSE as a modern plague. Mad cow disease is not just frightening and mysterious but possibly a symptom of a deeper malaise. It is one of a range of new diseases, including Aids, the Eboli virus and others, which are suspected of being a result of the impact of modern material 'progress' on the natural world.41 BSE has a special status among these in part because of its mystery, in part because of the greater directness of its connection to this 'progress' -and a particularly repugnant form at that. When the Prince of Wales asserted that 'BSE was just one example of how society, and farmers, had been "paying twice" for cheap food', he was echoing a widely-held view that intensive agriculture is practised at the expense of the well-being of the animal, plant and soil resources involved. For Alexander Cockburn it came ... as a sour irony that it's taken the very rare mad cow disease ... to raise the alarm about the consequences of intensive meat and milk production. After all, over the past 150 years such production has destroyed much of the world's ecological balance and impoverished or otherwise ruined millions of lives.42
It matters not that many forms of traditional farming can be destructive or that cattle have long been fed on various materials including the remains of other cattle.43 Knowledge of the probable cause of BSE touched a deep nerve in
